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SHORT SUMMARY 
This paper assesses Fodor’s argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive physicalism. The 
empirical evidence for cross-species multiple realizability is weak, and we reject a “thin” notion of intra-
species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. 
More plausibly, the neural realizers of mental events are global neural properties. But this suggests 
reductive rather than nonreductive physicalism. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive 
physicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability 
is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a “thin” notion of intra-
species multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. 
We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But 
there are more plausible candidates for the neural realizers of mental events out there, namely, global 
neural properties such as the average firing rates of neural populations, or the local field potential. The 
problem for Fodor’s argument is that those global neural properties point towards reductive versions of 
physicalism.  
Keywords: Multiple Realizability, Fodor, Reductive physicalism, Nonreductive physicalism 
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RESUMEN 
Este artículo evalúa el conocido argumento de Fodor a partir de la realización múltiple a favor del fisicalismo no reductivo. 
La investigación reciente ha revelado que la evidencia empírica para la realizabilidad múltiple entre especies es débil en el 
mejor de los casos, por lo que consideramos si el argumento puede reiniciarse utilizando una noción "delgada" de 
realizabilidad múltiple intra-especie, tomando los patrones de activación neuronal individuales como los realizadores de 
sucesos mentales. Estamos de acuerdo en que no hay perspectivas de reducir los sucesos mentales a patrones de activación 
neuronal individuales. Pero hay más candidatos plausibles para los realizadores neuronales de los eventos mentales, a saber, 
propiedades neuronales globales como las tasas de disparo promedio de las poblaciones neuronales o el potencial de campo 
local. El problema para el argumento de Fodor es que esas propiedades neuronales globales apuntan hacia versiones 
reductivas del fisicalismo. 
 
Palabras clave: Realizabilidad multiple, Fodor, Fisicalismo reductivo, Fisicalismo no-reductivo 
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1  Fodor’s Nonreductive Physicalism, Functionalism, and Multiple Realization  
Among his many contributions to analytic philosophy of mind, Fodor pioneered the now widely held 
view known as non-reductive physicalism (Block & Fodor, 1972; Fodor, 1974, 1975). Fodor’s concern in 
these initial papers was to maintain what he took to be the central tenet of physicalism, the ‘generality’ of 
physics, while retaining the autonomy of the special sciences (and of psychology in particular).  
The ‘generality of physics’, according to Fodor, is “…roughly, the view that all events which fall under 
the laws of any science are physical events and hence fall under the laws of physics” (Fodor 1974, p. 97). 
With regard to psychology, a commitment to the generality of physics amounts to a commitment to a 
token-identity between psychological events and physical events (so that every event that falls under the 
laws of psychology is identical to a physical event that falls under some law of physics). Fodor argued 
that accepting token-physicalism does not entail type-physicalism; it does not entail that psychological 
kinds (or properties) are reducible to physical kinds (or properties). And, conversely, denying the 
reducibility of psychology—affirming its autonomy from physics—does not require abandoning 
physicalism.  
The compatibility of these two claims—generality of physics and autonomy of psychology—is claimed to 
hold because mental kinds are functional kinds. That is, mental kinds (along with other, perhaps all, special 
science kinds) are individuated not by features of their material composition or structure, but by their 
functional-causal profile, where this is specified by the causal lawlike generalizations (of psychology) 
holding over the mental predicates that correspond to those kinds.1 As functional kinds, psychological 
kinds can (metaphysically and nomologically) be realized by many different kinds of physical states. Very 
different types of systems, from organic brains to silicon chips might, when properly ‘hooked up’, have 
the same functional-causal profile that individuates a single mental kind.2  
Furthermore, Fodor concludes that, as a matter of empirical fact, psychological kinds most probably are 
multiply realized. Drawing upon Putnam’s (1967) ‘Psychological Predicates’, Block and Fodor argue that 
“[t]he argument against physicalism rests upon the empirical likelihood that creatures of different 
composition and structure, which are in no interesting sense in identical physical states, can nevertheless 
be in identical psychological states; hence that types of psychological states are not in correspondence 
with types of physical states.”(Block and Fodor, 1972, p. 160) That is, recognizing that the same 
psychological generalizations are likely to hold of creatures vastly different in their physical 
composition—human beings, cats, and Martians—and perhaps indefinitely many such systems (if we 
consider functionally similar computational systems)—blocks any possible identification of the mental 
                                                      
1 “[T]he basic condition upon type identity in science” Block and Fodor (1972) tell us “is that it makes possible 
the articulation of the domain of laws.” And, “then it looks as though substantive conditions upon type identity of 
psychological states will be imposed by reference to the psychological (and perhaps neurological) laws which 
operate upon those states and in no other way.” (1972, p. 179-180) 
2 As Block and Fodor say: “in all probability, distinct neurological states can be functionally identical. That is, 
satisfaction of the criteria for type-distinctness of neurological states probably does not guarantee satisfaction of 
the criteria for type-distinctness of psychological states or vice versa.” (1972, p. 180) 
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kinds appearing in such generalizations with corresponding physical kinds. This is the multiple 
realizability argument against the reducibility of mental to physical kinds. 
Given the centrality of this argument to Fodor’s position (and other non-reductive physicalists), it has 
received a great deal of attention throughout the years.3 In sections 2 and 3 we address one recent and 
especially interesting objection to the multiple realizability of mental kinds, as advanced by Polger and 
Shapiro (2016). We argue that though their objections are effective against Fodor’s original appeal to 
(inter-species) multiple realizability (section 2), he may be able to fortify his argument for non-reductive 
physicalism against such objections by appeal to the empirical plausibility of a more limited (intra-
species) variety (section 3), based on the popular supposition that events of a single mental kind are 
realized by diverse neural firing patterns. However, in section 4 we argue that neural firing patterns are 
not the best candidates to serve as realizers of mental events. Instead, the most plausible realizers of 
mental events are higher-level, global, neural properties. As we bring out, this view of how mental events 
are realized speaks against Fodor’s non-reductive physicalism and in favor of a reductive version of 
physicalism.  
 
2  Polger and Shapiro on Multiple Realizability 
Larry Shapiro and Tom Polger have mounted a powerful attack on the argument from multiple 
realizability, directed specifically against Fodor’s arguments for non-reductive physicalism (e.g., Shapiro, 
2000, 2008, 2010; Polger, 2002, 2004, 2009; Shapiro and Polger, 2012) culminating in their co-authored, 
and appropriately titled, The Multiple Realization Book (Polger and Shapiro, 2016).  
Polger and Shapiro begin with the observation that traditional proponents of non-reductive physicalism, 
Fodor among them, sometimes operate with a notion of multiple realizability that illicitly considers any 
variation in would-be realizers as proof that the kind in question is multiply realizable. They agree that 
the world is full of variation, and that, as a result, we can expect to find a great deal of variability among 
different instances of the same natural kind. Yet, to establish that some natural kind is multiply realizable, 
variation in its instances, its would-be realizers, must be of the right sort. And, significantly, whether with 
respect to any particular natural kind the variation in its would-be realizers is of the right sort is an 
empirical question that cannot be resolved a priori. 
To illustrate their main point, their favored example is the corkscrew.4 Corkscrews, they note, come in a 
great variety of different shapes, sizes, and colors, and are made of various different materials, from 
plastics, to wood, steel and titanium, all of which satisfy the function ‘corked-bottle in ® uncorked-
bottle out’. Nonetheless, they argue, it would be a mistake merely on those grounds to suppose that the kind 
‘corkscrew’ is multiply realizable. Variation in color and material composition among different 
corkscrews is irrelevant to whether the kind ‘corkscrew’ is multiply realized, as such features are irrelevant 
                                                      
3 There is a vast literature on the multiple realizability argument. See Bickle (2019) for a review and comprehensive 
bibliography.  
4 As they note, being a corkscrew isn’t a pure functional kind, as being a member of this kind presumably requires 
satisfying certain material and structural constraints—at the very least involving a screw of sufficient rigidity. 
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to their satisfying the corkscrew-function. Nonetheless, they argue that the functional kind ‘corkscrew’ is 
multiply realizable by different kinds of mechanisms—there are single lever, ‘waiter’, corkscrews, there are 
double lever corkscrews, and likely many other screw-involving mechanisms that when in appropriate 
contact with a corked bottle produce an uncorked bottle in its stead. What makes these not merely 
different instances of the corkscrew kind, but different realizers of the same functional kind is that each 
requires a different mechanical explanation of how the function that individuates the kind ‘corkscrew’ is 
brought about.5  
More generally, Polger and Shapiro propose their ‘Official Recipe’ for multiple realization (2016, p. 67). 
For two entities, A and B, to be different realizers (rather than mere instances) of the same realized kind, 
and, hence, for the latter to count as multiply realized, the following criteria must be satisfied:  
1. As and Bs are of the same kind in model or taxonomic system S1 (the realized kind). 
2. As and Bs are of different kinds in model or taxonomic system S2 (the realizing kinds). 
3. The factors that lead the As and Bs to be differently classified by S2 must be among those that 
lead them to be commonly classified by S1. 
4. The relevant S2-variation between As and Bs must be distinct from the S1 intra-kind variation 
between As and Bs, rather than simply mapping onto the S1 kind variation. 
Conditions (3) and (4) are the most crucial elements here. Condition (3) captures the requirement that 
the differences between As and Bs must be relevant to their both being classified as the same realized 
kind, while condition (4) requires that the differences between As and Bs do not merely map onto 
individual differences within the same functional kind, but that they contribute to their sameness with 
respect to the functional kind; so that As and Bs are, as they put it, ‘differently the same’. Thus, while it 
is clear that the length of the lever in a single-lever corkscrew is relevant to its carrying out its corkscrew 
function—thus, different corkscrews that differ in the length of their lever, would satisfy condition (3)—
nonetheless, variations in the length of the lever also bring about differences in the corkscrew’s 
functional description—for example, how well or easily the corkscrew function is carried out. Thus, the 
two corkscrews would not satisfy condition (4), because they would be differently different (even though 
these differences are within the same broad functional kind), not differently the same.  
They sum up their position:  
“We have argued that multiple realization is not just variation, it is a distinctive kind of variation. 
This is why the mere fact that the world is Heraclitean—that all is flux—does not by itself show 
that mental states are multiply realized. Multiple realization requires a special pattern of variation: 
Relevantly the same function performed in relevantly different ways, where the differences 
                                                      
5 As Polger and Shapiro put it: “Because these two devices make use of different mechanical principles—one 
levers, one rack and pinions, and so forth—we conclude that they do the corkscrew job in different ways ... In 
contrast, if we consider two waiter’s corkscrews that differ in the material of which they are made … or in their 
color …, the imagined science of mechanical artifacts tells us that these differences are not relevant differences 
(Shapiro, 2000). The reason is that the same explanation of how the device does its corkscrew job applies to all of 
them, regardless of material composition and color.” (Polger and Shapiro, 2016, p. 65) 
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contribute to the sameness in function and not just to the differences in function.” (Polger and 
Shapiro 2016, p. 77) 
With this in mind, they argue that we have little reason to think that specifically mental kinds are multiply 
realizable. Consider Fodor’s argument for the multiple realizability of mental kinds. Fodor claims that a 
great variety of species, both actual (human beings, cats, etc.) and imagined (e.g., Martians), can realize 
the same functional mental kinds. However, as Polger and Shapiro argue, whether some kind or other is 
multiply realizable depends on whether we have plausible empirical reasons to think that the variations 
in would-be realizers are of the right kind. It depends on whether ‘relevantly the same function is 
performed in relevantly different ways.’  
And, in fact, as many have argued (Polger and Shapiro, most recently, but see also Couch, 2004), the 
assumption that psychological generalizations cut across different species lacks empirical grounding. 
Different species are not merely different with respect to their physical composition and structure; they 
are also functionally different. And, if so, we have good reasons to think that it is not the case that across 
different species ‘relevantly the same functions are performed in relevantly different ways’; thus, violating 
condition (1) above. Furthermore, to the extent that similar functions are performed by different physical 
systems, it is likely that the differences among these physical systems merely account for the differences in 
function, rather than their similarity. In this way, these differences would not count as different realizers 
of the same function, as they would violate point (4) of Polger and Shapiro’s criteria for multiple 
realizations above.  
As one example, discussed by Couch (2004) and later by Polger and Shapiro (2016), consider the case of 
the camera eye, different instances of which occur in human beings and octopuses (among other species, 
of course). On the face of it, the camera eye appears to be multiply realized by two physically different 
systems that have evolved independently but are the product of convergent evolutionary forces (where 
the same traits are ‘selected for’ by different evolutionary pressures).6 As Couch notes, though both eyes 
involve a single lens and a retina, they differ in the kinds of pigments in their photoreceptors. 
Furthermore, “The retina in the human eye contains an array of rods and cones, and light is focused 
onto the receptors by bending the lens to change its shape. The retina in the octopus eye contains 
rhabdomeres, and focusing light involves moving the lens backwards and forwards within the shell. The 
parts of the structures are different and operate in different ways.”(Couch, 2004, p. 202) Importantly, 
these differences in the implementing physical mechanisms count against the claim that the camera eye is 
multiply realized, because they bring with them stark functional differences. For example, having a single 
pigment means that octopuses are color blind, and they respond to different kinds of stimuli with 
different reaction times, etc.  
The example of camera eyes in different species is not a direct example of a mental kind, but given that 
the eye is a critical component of the physical realizer of a creature’s perceptual states, it is certainly 
relevant to the question of whether the same kinds of perceptual states are multiply realized in different 
species. Though at a high level of abstraction it is clear that both octopuses and human beings have 
                                                      
6 Evolutionary convergence was one of Block and Fodor’s (1972) central empirical considerations in favor of the 
multiple realizability of mental kinds.  
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perceptual states, the differences among the realizers of these perceptual states account for differences 
among the kinds of perceptual states realized.7 More generally, the fact that different species significantly 
differ with respect to their sensory systems (as well as their output, behavioral, systems) should already 
call to question the functionalist supposition that the same range of psychological generalizations will 
hold across these species.8  
Another example presented by Polger and Shapiro with some detail concerns, a favorite of 
functionalists, the physical realizers of pain across species. The observation that different species of 
animal exhibit similar avoidance behaviors in response to noxious stimuli prompts us, along with 
Putnam, Block, Fodor and others, to suppose that these different species all realize the same mental kind 
pain. However, for pain to be multiply realized by these different species, the similar functional kind 
must be accompanied by relevant differences among its physical realizers. Yet, upon inspection, they 
argue, we find a great deal of relevant physical commonality among different creatures to which we are 
prone to attribute pain—physical commonality that accounts for the mental similarity. Focusing on 
octopuses once more, to the extent that we are willing to attribute to them pain, we find that they share 
similar physical mechanism to those underlying human pains. Like human beings, octopuses too (like 
many others in the animal kingdom) have nociceptors, and mechanoreceptors in particular, that account 
for their reactions to mechanical damage. Yet, because they lack thermal nociceptors, they do not react 
as human beings do to cold. Thus, octopus-pain is different from human pain—the latter but not the 
former is an outcome of extreme cold—but it is also similar. And, crucially, the similarities and 
differences among the realized mental kinds are accounted for by the similarities and differences among 
their physical realizers (thus, once more, violating either condition (1) or (4) of their official recipe). 
Contrary to initial appearances, the empirical evidence suggests that pain is not multiply realizable 
between octopuses and human beings (and many other creatures).9  
                                                      
7 So, if we elect to individuate perceptual states coarsely, taking into account only very coarse-grained 
psychological generalizations, we will find that such psychological generalizations appealing to such perceptual-
functional kinds do in fact hold of a variety of species. But, then, the differences among the physical realizers of 
those coarse-grained perceptual kinds will merely account for individual differences within the same functional 
kind, and in this way violate condition (4) of Polger and Shapiro’s recipe for multiple realization. On the other 
hand, if we individuate perceptual states finely, taking into account very fine-grained psychological generalizations, 
we will find that such psychological generalizations do not hold across different species. The physical differences 
among realizers account for their realizing different perceptual-functional kinds, and in this way violate condition 
(1) of the recipe.  
8 “[E]stablishing multiple realization requires showing that the same psychological state has diverse realizations. 
But we can always disagree with the functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological differences at another 
level of description. So what needs to be established is that the psychological states are type identical, but it seems 
it will only be shown that the states have superficial resemblances.” (Couch, 2004, p. 203) 
9 Another interesting example involving the octopus, which Polger and Shapiro discuss (2016, pp. 113-114), is the 
memory. Both human beings and octopi have memory, yet in the case of the former a hippocampus is involved 
whereas the octopus lacks a hippocampus. On the face of it this appears the kind memory appears to be multiply 
realized. Yet, quoting from Hochner et al. (2006), Polger and Shapiro suggest that the same features of the 
hippocampus that realize memory in human beings are also present in the octopus’ MSF-VL system and are 
responsible for realizing memory in the octopus. Though there are anatomical and physiological differences 
between the two systems, the systems are similar with respect to the features that are relevant to each system’s 
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Finally, Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that reflection on the actual conduct and history of cognitive 
science reveals that such research relies on there being both functional and physiological commonalities 
across species. Without such commonalities, animal models would be of little use in the study of human 
cognition. Yet, such models have historically been, and still are, immensely informative. As just a couple 
of examples, we can think of Mishkin and Ungerleider’s (1983) research on the two visual systems, 
which was originally conducted on macaques, and Felleman and van Essen’s (1991) identification of 32 
different visual processing areas, once more, in the macaque.10 The significance of this research is its 
applicability to human vision, and such applicability is premised on the inter-species similarity between the 
underlying brain structures realizing similar visual processes. Such similarities are in fact found. And, the 
historical success of such research is good reason to take the premise to be warranted.11 Thus, though 
the physical structures that realize, say, object identification in the macaque brain and the physical 
structures realizing the same perceptual process in human beings differ, it turns out that those 
differences aren’t relevant differences. Object identification is not multiply realized because, as Polger and 
Shapiro would put it, the differences among physical realizers are not differences that contribute to the 
sameness of the realized function, thus violating condition (3) of their official recipe. 
Taking these different examples together, we find that Fodor’s claims about the likelihood of inter-
species multiple realization lack empirical support. In many cases, what was initially thought of as a 
single, but multiply realized, mental kind turns out upon closer inspection to be different mental kinds. 
In such cases, it turns out that the generalizations of psychology do not hold across species, as physical 
differences among species are accompanied by relevant functional differences that suggest that what was 
initially considered a single mental kind ought to be split into different mental kinds (this is what is often 
termed ‘kind-splitting’, discussed at some length by Polger and Shapiro). As we have seen, both 
octopuses and human beings perceive and feel pain. Yet the physiological differences between the two 
species—differences in the kinds of pigments in their photoreceptors, or difference in the range of 
nociceptors they have—realize different kinds of perceptions and different kinds of pains; thus, violating 
condition (1) of Polger and Shapiro’s official recipe. (Alternatively, these same physiological differences 
merely account for individual differences within the same coarse-grained mental kind, in which case 
condition (4) is violated.) In other cases, when we have good reason to suppose that similar 
psychological generalizations do hold across different species, we find physiological commonalities 
accounting for that fact (thus violating condition (3)). Indeed, comparative neuroanatomical cognitive 
research requires, and its success in turn supports, the existence of such physiological similarities in 
functionally similar species. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
realizing the same mental/cognitive kind, memory. As a result, the variability between human beings and octopi 
does not give us reason to suppose that memory is multiply realized by the two kinds of systems.   
10 The significant point, as they say, is that “…while van Essen's ultimate interest is in human visual processing, 
this work has been carried out on the macaque. The clear assumption is that the neural organization in the 
macaque will provide a defeasible guide to the human brain.”(Bechtel and Mundale, 1999, p. 183)  
11 As they say: “One might think, at first glance, that the ability to make comparisons across species actually 
depends upon multiple realizability. In fact, it is the very similarity (or more precisely, homology) of brain 
structures which permits us to generalize across certain species. So, in this latter respect, in the context of 
neuroscientific research, they are not multiply realized.”(Bechtel and Mundale, 1999, pp. 177-178) 
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There are obvious limits to what can be concluded from examples such as these. But, at a minimum, we 
can safely say that the argument for multiple realizability across species is far from secure. The best 
argument for multiple realizability would be actual examples of functional kinds that are multiply realized 
across different species and it is not clear that there are any examples satisfying the four criteria that 
Polger and Shapiro propose. Since Fodor rightly emphasized that multiple realizability is an empirical 
claim, this leaves his argument for nonreductive physicalism somewhat of a hostage to fortune.  
But perhaps there are examples of multiple realizability holding within species, rather than across 
species. This would give examples of what we will term thin multiple realizability, as opposed to the thick 
multiple realizability that would be yielded if psychological kinds were to turn out to be multiply realizable 
across species. We will be exploring this possibility in the remainder of this paper, considering whether it 
can be used to reboot Fodor’s argument for nonreductive physicalism in the face of the multiple 
problems that there seem to be for the original argument based on thick, cross-species multiple 
realizability.  
 
3 Using thin multiple realizability to reboot Fodor’s argument against nonreductive 
physicalism 
As we observed in the previous section, there is little compelling evidence that any psychological 
capacities are multiply realized across species, and what evidence there is projects a much more complex 
picture than Fodor’s argument from multiple realizability for nonreductive physicalism suggests. This 
section considers a more mundane type of multiple realizability, holding within a species rather than 
across species, and shows how it can be used to reboot Fodor’s argument.  
We begin by pointing out what we are not talking about. Some proponents of multiple realizability have 
proposed neural plasticity as a candidate source of multiple realizability. In particular, they have pointed 
to the phenomenon of cortical plasticity, which occurs when one cortical area adapts to perform a 
function or functions normally carried out by a different cortical area that has been damaged or is 
dysfunctional for some other reason.12 Polger and Shapiro (2016) argue convincingly that even the most 
plausible candidates (such as the interesting example of ferrets “rewired” so that visual information from 
their right visual field is processed by the auditory cortex) fail to satisfy the four criteria in their Official 
Recipe, for reasons similar to those that count against candidates for cross-species multiple realization.13 
As with the cross-species examples, the jury is still out, of course, but to the extent that cases of neural 
plasticity are to supply effective support for multiple realization, they must meet the four criteria 
identified above, and none that we know of so far seem capable of doing so. 
The type of thin multiple realizability that we will be discussing is much simpler altogether. To get the 
flavor of the proposal consider the following passage from Peter Menzies, describing experiments 
                                                      
12 See for example Barrett (2013) and Richardson (2009) for philosophical appeals to cortical plasticity as evidence 
of multiple realizability.  
13 See Polger and Shapiro (2016, Ch. 5). 
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carried out by Richard Andersen and colleagues at the California Institute of Technology on how 
intentions to reach are encoded in the monkey motor cortex. 
The neural signals that encode the monkey’s intentions to reach for certain targets were recorded 
as averages of the firing rates (spikes per second) of individual neurons. But clearly the same 
aggregate firing rate in a group of neurons is consistent with a lot of variation in the behavior of 
individual neurons. For example, very different temporal sequences of neural firings can give rise 
to the same firing rate. So an intention to reach for a certain target can be realized in many 
different ways at the level of individual neurons. (Menzies, 2013 p. 62) 
According to Menzies, therefore, a given intention to reach a specific target is multiply realized (over 
time) by different token patterns of neural firings.  
Clearly, this way of thinking about multiple realizability is very different from that discussed, and 
criticized, in the previous section, as well as from cortical plasticity. And at first glance it seems immune 
to the general line of objection raised by Polger and Shapiro against these more complex candidates for 
multiple realizability, because it is assumed ex hypothesi that there are no significant functional differences 
across the different neural realizers. Indeed, in the experimental set-up described the truth of the 
assumption is guaranteed, because the monkey is trained to make exactly the same movement across the 
different trials, and what is multiply realized is the intention to make that movement. 
In fact, it seems that his type of thin multiple realizability satisfies the four criteria in Polger and 
Shapiro’s Official Recipe. Consider a situation in which a single intention to move I7 is multiply realized 
within the same monkey by two different neural firing patterns, say, NFP26 and NFP47. Here is how each 
of the criteria are satisfied: 
(i) NFP26 and NFP47 are both correctly classified as instances of the same intention to move, 
I7. 
(ii) NFP26 and NFP47 are both correctly classified as different neural firing patterns. 
(iii) The factors that lead NFP26 and NFP47 to be differently classified qua neural firing 
patterns are among those that lead them both to count as instances of the same intention 
to move. This holds because they differ in the respective firing profile of their 
constituent neurons, but it is their firing profiles that secure their common causal profile.  
(iv) The variation between NFP26 and NFP47 qua neural firing patterns is distinct from any 
variation that there might be between them qua intentions to move. This holds trivially 
because there are no, or only negligible differences between them qua intentions to move. 
On the face of it, therefore, there seems to be at least one example of thin multiple realizability that 
satisfies Polger and Shapiro’s Official Recipe. And if this example works, then so too must countlessly 
many others. 
The question that we will tackle in the remainder of this paper is whether appealing to this type of thin 
multiple realizability can reboot Fodor’s argument from multiple realizability to nonreductive 
physicalism, given the lack of substantive evidence for the stronger forms of thick multiple realizability 
that he himself proposed and discussed.  
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It will helpful for the following to have a more detailed perspective on what Fodor thinks that 
nonreductive physicalism involves, and how exactly it is supported by multiple realizability. Fodor is 
working with a standard, Nagelian (1961), account of reduction, which requires the existence of ‘bridge 
laws’ relating predicates of the special science—here, psychology—and physical predicates. On this view, 
where S is some special science, say psychology, and S1x ® S2x is a law within S, “[a] necessary and 
sufficient condition of the reduction of (1) [S1x ® S2x] to a law of physics is that the formulae (2) and 
(3) be laws, and a necessary and sufficient condition of the reduction of S to physics is that all its laws be 
so reducible.  
(2a) S1x Û P1x 
(2b) S2x Û P2x 
(3) P1x ® P2x. 
‘P1’ and ‘P2’ are supposed to be predicates of physics, and (3) is supposed to be a physical law.” (Fodor 
1974, p. 98) 
Fodor takes the multiple realizability argument to show that there can be no such bridge laws.14 That is, 
given that a host of different physical systems can satisfy the same natural kind predicates of 
psychology—i.e., the multiple realizability considerations above—we can, at best, expect to find ‘bridge 
laws’ that relate a mental predicate to a wildly heterogenous disjunction of physical predicates (of the form Sx 
Û P1x or P2x or P3x or P4x…). He observes: “…this is tantamount to allowing that at least some ‘bridge 
laws’ may, in fact, not turn out to be laws, since … a necessary condition on a universal generalization 
being lawlike is that the predicates which constitute its antecedent and consequent should pick out 
natural kinds.”(1974, p. 108) Yet, the wildly heterogenous disjunction of physical predicates to which the 
candidate ‘bridge’ law refers (i.e., P1x or P2x or P3x or P4x…) does not pick a natural kind, because 
disjunctive predicates are not projectible (Fodor, 1974, 1997; Kim 1992). 
It is straightforward to run a version of this argument using the example of thin multiple realizability 
above. Let’s say that it is a law of psychology that an intention to act in a certain way will (if the 
appropriate background conditions are satisfied) lead to the relevant action. We can write this as I7 ® A. 
Suppose as before that I7 is multiply realized by neural firing patterns NFP26 and NFP47 and that we are 
interested in a potential reduction of psychology to neuroscience (which is surely an essential step on any 
reduction of psychology to physics). Then, on the Nagelian model, a successful reduction requires a bona 
                                                      
14 “What I have been doubting is that there are neurological natural kinds co-extensive with psychological natural 
kinds. What seems increasingly clear is that, even if there is such a co-extension, it cannot be lawlike. For, it seems 
increasingly likely that there are nomologically possible systems other than organisms (namely, automata) which 
satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy no neurological predicates at all. Now, as Putnam 
has emphasized, if there are any such systems, then there are probably vast numbers, since equivalent automata 
can be made out of practically anything. If this observation is correct, then there can be no serious hope that the 
class of automata whose psychology is effectively identical to that of some organism can be described by physical 
natural kind predicates….” (Fodor, 1974, p. 105) 
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fide law of the form I7 Û (NFP26 Ú NFP47). But there can be no such bona fide law because (NFP26 Ú 
NFP47) is not a natural kind.  
 
4 Assessing the rebooted argument from thin multiple realizability 
We are prepared to grant that the rebooted argument from thin multiple realizability succeeds in 
showing that there can be no reduction of intentions to move to neural firing patterns—and hence that 
there are no prospects for reducing psychological laws involving intentions to move to neuroscientific 
laws involving neural firing patterns. However, we reject the claim that this shows that there can be no 
reduction of psychology to neuroscience. The basic problem with this line of argument is that it is 
mistaken as to the candidates it proposes for the neural realizers of intentions to move—and, by 
extension, for where in general it thinks that the neural realizers of psychological events are likely to be 
found. There is no reason that the realizers of psychological events will be highly specific neural events, 
such as actual neural firing patterns. Instead, we propose, there are far more plausible candidates for the 
role of neural realizers. And when we switch attention to more plausible candidates, we will see that 
there actually are good grounds for thinking that there exist precisely the type of laws that the rebooted 
argument claims do not exist. 
Here is a preliminary observation. As mentioned in section 1, it is a basic tenet of Fodor’s nonreductive 
physicalism that mental events be token-identical to their neural realizers. However, there is a simple 
reason for thinking that mental events cannot be token-identical to actual neural firing patterns. This is 
because some of the counterfactuals that are true of a given mental event fail to hold of the 
corresponding neural firing pattern.  
As before, let I7 be a particular intention to move; let NFP26 be the associated neural firing pattern in the 
monkey motor cortex; and let A be the relevant reaching movement. Then we can expect the following 
two counterfactuals to hold: 
 (4a) I7  ® A 
 (4b) NFP26  ® A 
In the language of possible worlds, (4a) says that in all the nearby worlds in which the intention I7  
occurs, so too does the action A, while (4b) says the same thing of neural firing pattern NFP26. Consider, 
however, the following two counterfactuals: 
 (5a) ~I7  ® ~A 
 (5b) ~NFP26  ® ~A 
On the face of it, (5a) holds, but not (5b). (5a) holds because in all the nearby worlds in which the 
intention to move is absent, the monkey fails to perform action A. In contrast, (5b) fails to hold, because 
the nearby worlds in which neural firing pattern NFP26 does not occur are worlds in which some other 
neural firing pattern with the same causal profile occurs (say, NFP47), bringing about action A. To put it 
another way, for the monkey to move despite not intending to move, there would have to be some fairly 
fundamental changes either in the antecedent conditions or in the laws of nature—whereas a world in 
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which the monkey moves in the absence of neural firing pattern NFP26 would differ from this world 
only in the firing behavior of a relatively small number of neurons.15  
That neural firing patterns stand in different counterfactual relations to actions than do intentions to 
move (and mental events more generally) is not news. Some philosophers have drawn drastic 
conclusions from it. E. J. Lowe, for example, has tried to use those different counterfactual relations as 
an in-principle argument against any version of token-identity.16 Only slightly less ambitiously, Peter 
Menzies, independently and in collaboration with Christian List, has used pretty much the very example 
that we are discussing in a series of papers to argue against the causal closure of the physical (Menzies, 
2013, 2015; List and Menzies, 2009; Menzies and List, 2010). In our view, Lowe, Menzies, and List are 
all over-stating the case.17 At most, all we can conclude is that specific neural firing patterns are not the 
right candidates to serve as the realizers of given mental events. But that should simply motivate us to 
look elsewhere for the appropriate realizers, not to abandon either token-identity or the causal closure of 
the physical.  
Still, having said that, we do have a clear constraint upon any such candidate realizer, namely, that it 
should stand in the right kind of counterfactual relations, so that it satisfies the equivalents of both (4b) 
and (5b). To that end, we will argue in the following that the most plausible neural realizers for 
conscious mental events are not specific firing patterns, but rather higher-level, or global, properties of 
populations of neurons that are themselves instantiated in (but not necessarily realized by) specific firing 
patterns. Those higher-level properties stand in relations of counterfactual dependence to actions that 
typically mirror those of conscious mental events.  
In Bermúdez and Cahen (2018) we proposed a hypothesis about the high-level properties that realize 
mental events. That hypothesis drew on important work on the neural correlates of the BOLD (Blood 
Oxygen Level Dependent) signal, which is the quantity that is directly measured in functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI).18 The basic physiological premise of functional neuroimaging is that cognitive 
activity increases cellular activity, which in turn increases blood oxygenation, so that tracking changes in 
levels of blood oxygen as a cognitive task is performed is a good guide to the areas of the brain engaged 
in performing that task. But, neuroscientists have asked, what exactly is the cellular activity that brings 
about increases in blood oxygenation?  
The most obvious candidate, proposed by Geraint Rees, Karl Friston, and Christoph Koch among 
others, is that the blood oxygen level in a given neural region increases in proportion to the average 
firing rate of the neurons in that neural region (Rees, Friston, and Koch, 2000). Nikos Logothetis and 
collaborators came up with a different suggestion, based on justly celebrated experiments that involved 
                                                      
15 We are adopting a broadly Lewisian account of similarity across possible worlds, although we do not follow 
Lewis in adopting his strong centering requirement, which would make counterfactuals of the form (4a) and (4b) 
trivially true whenever the antecedent and the consequent are both true at the actual world.  
16 See, for example, Lowe (2008, pp. 103-107) and Paprzycka (2014) for critical discussion. 
17 We have discussed Menzies arguments in Bermúdez and Cahen (2015, 2018).  
18 For a less condensed exposition of the material in this and the following paragraph see section 3.6 of Bermúdez 
(2019).  
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recording single cells in the monkey primary visual cortex within an fMRI scanner (Logothetis 2001; 
Logothetis et al, 2001).19 The experimenters were able to calibrate the strength of the BOLD signal, as 
measured by fMRI, with more fine-grained measures of neural activity measured through single-cell 
recordings. The results seemed to point to an alternative to the average firing rate hypothesis. This is the 
local field potential, which is an electrophysiological signal believed to measure the sum of inputs to the 
neurons in a given area—as opposed to the neural firing rates, which are the outputs from the neurons.   
Both the local field potential and average firing rates are examples of global properties of neural 
populations that have been studied by neuroscientists. We suggest that the realizers of mental events are 
such global neural properties (GNP), as opposed to specific neural firing rates.20 There is no need for the 
moment to identity a specific type of GNP as a candidate realizer. All we want to propose is that we 
should be looking for the realizers of mental events at the level of GNPs, rather than at the level of 
specific neural firing patterns. The important point is that GNPs stand in a many-one relation to specific 
neural firing patterns.21 
Suppose, then, that the neural realizers for mental events are GNPs, as we have suggested, and consider 
the overarching aim of functional neuroimaging. One of the basic goals of functional neuroimaging is to 
identify meaningful correlations between the performance of different cognitive tasks, on the one hand, 
and the BOLD signal, on the other.22 Moreover, the basic aim of experimental design in imaging studies 
is to screen out correlations that are not law-like. Hence the emphasis on replicability and consistency 
across studies. Of course, the enterprise is still at a relatively early stage of development, and there are all 
sorts of methodological issues to tackle.23 But still, we claim, the project of functional neuroimaging 
makes scientific sense to the extent that it looks for law-like correlations between different types of 
cognitive function (as manifested in experimental tasks) and cellular activity in the brain, as measured in 
the BOLD signal.  
If this way of thinking about the enterprise of functional neuroimaging is correct, then we can expect a 
completed neuroscience to contain laws connecting different types of cognitive activity to global 
properties of neural populations. Let’s hypothesize that neuroscience has moved on a long way, so that 
functional neuroimagers are able to identify not just changes in the BOLD signal, but also the underlying 
                                                      
19 These experiments were very complex from an engineering point of view, because the standard (metal) tools for 
single cell recording cannot be used in the magnetic field of a scanner 
20 In the remainder of this section we will speak in terms of mental events being realized by properties. Strictly 
speaking, the neural realizers are events with the relevant participating properties.   
21 It may be more appropriate to think of the relation as instantiation, rather than realization. For one reason, as 
we will shortly see, the counterfactual dependence between GNPs and actions maps onto that between intentions 
and actions, which is not true of specific neural firing patterns. See Bermúdez and Cahen (2018, n. 16). 
22 Of course, this is not the only goal. Functional neuroimagers are also greatly concerned, for example, to plot 
patterns of functional and effective connectivity within the brain. But arguably it is the existence of meaningful 
correlations between mental activity and the BOLD signal that underwrites, and gives point to, the search for 
connectivity.  
23 For more details see Bermúdez (2019) Ch. 9, as well as sections 3.5, 3.6, and 17.1.  
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global neural properties. This is all that we would need to derive the required conclusions about 
counterfactual dependence.  
Let’s assume, to stick with our example, that the motor intention I7 is operationalized through a 
particular task. That task might, in fact, be performing action A. After repeated, well-designed 
experiments in the scanner, a team of neuroscientists proposes as a law that some particular GNP, say 
GNP123, reliably causes action A (when the background conditions are appropriately configured). GNP123 
might be a given average firing rate for some neurons in the motor cortex, or it might be a specific value 
for the local field potential for that population of neurons—or some as yet unknown global neural 
property. Then, given that laws support counterfactuals and that performing action A is the experimental 
operationalization of motor intention I7, it will follow that the following two pairs of counterfactuals 
both hold: 
 (6a) I7  ® A 
 (6b) GNP123  ® A 
and 
 (7a) ~I7  ® ~A 
 (7b) ~GNP123  ® ~A 
These are exactly the counterfactuals required for GNP123 to count as a realizer of I7. 
However, and here is the rub, the very reasons that make GNP123 a plausible candidate for the neural 
realizer of motor intention I7 count towards reductive physicalism, not a Fodorean non-reductive 
physicalism.24 This is because all the considerations that we have been reviewing point towards the 
existence of precisely the kind of bridge laws that yield a standard, Nagelian reduction. If there is a 
lawlike correlation between GNP123 and action A, and performing action A is the experimental 
operationalization of motor intention I7, then there seem no good reasons to deny the existence of a 
bridge law linking I7 and GNP123. But once we have those bridge laws, then we are well on the way to 
reductive physicalism. 
 
5 Conclusion 
For Fodor, the route to non-reductive physicalism relies on the multiple realizability of mental kinds. It 
is multiple realizability that guarantees that no genuine bridge laws relating mental kinds to physical kinds 
can be established, so that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. However, as Fodor claims, and 
Polger and Shapiro (2016) emphasize, the multiple realizability of the mental is an empirical hypothesis. 
As such, its plausibility depends on what evidence we might have for the actual multiple realization of the 
mental. Yet, when considering the actual evidence, things don’t look good for non-reductive physicalism.  
                                                      
24 In his (2012), Shapiro provides different motivations for thinking that the realizers of mental events may be higher-order 
(or, ‘aggregate’) neural properties, which would call into question the thesis of distinctness at the heart of non-reductive 
physicalism. 
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Genuine cases of cross-species (or, thick) multiple realizability, which were the focus of Fodor’s original 
arguments, are hard to come by. Closer inspection of initially appealing examples, such as the presence 
of pains or a capacity for memory in octopuses, reveals their appeal to be illusory.  
Nonetheless, Fodor could still support non-reductive physicalism if he could establish the empirical 
plausibility of thin, intra-species, multiple realizability of mental kinds. Indeed, many have thought that 
mental kinds are multiply realized by different neural firing patterns, in different individuals within a 
species, and even in different time slices of a single individual. However, we have argued that upon 
closer inspection neural firing patterns are not plausible candidate realizers of mental kinds. Instead, we 
argued that the neural realizers of mental kinds are more plausibly higher-level, global, properties of 
neural assemblies. Yet, crucially, because such properties stand in the same relevant counterfactual 
dependence relations as do the mental kinds they realize, we have good reason to think that these mental 
kinds are reducible to those higher-level properties.  
In sum, contra Fodor, empirical considerations lead us to deny the (inter-species and intra-species) 
multiple realizability of mental kinds, to deny non-reductive physicalism and the autonomy of 
psychology, and to affirm, instead, the possible reducibility of psychology to neuroscience.25   
                                                      
25 We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this paper. We are also grateful to the Israeli Science Foundation 
for a grant (425/15) that supported Arnon Cahen’s work on this paper. 
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